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In 1992, in Rio, the industrialised countries (grouped asParties included in Annex 1), conscious of their historicresponsibility for the growing concentration of green-
house gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, agreed to take the
initiative in the battle to counter the greenhouse effect.
Under the aegis of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they committed them-
selves to stabilise, by around 2000, their GHG emissions at
1990 levels. In 1997, they decided to go further by adopting
the Kyoto Protocol((1) and committing themselves to legally
binding targets: by 2008-2012, they have to reduce their
GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% below 1990 levels.
This is the first of the five-year targets. According to the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Pro-
tocol’s targets are not ambitious enough to reverse the
process whereby GHGs are growingly concentrated in the at-
mosphere((2). They are sufficient only to slow this process
down((3). This slowing down must be seen in relation to the
requirements of the Convention’s ultimate objective, which is
the “stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the at-
mosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system((4).”
The experts consider that it is necessary first to impose a ceiling
on GHG concentration and then to reduce it so that, by around
2050, global temperatures would be held at a level no more than
2°C higher than in the pre-industrial period. This would assume
that global emissions be halved by that date and that the devel-
oped countries reduce theirs by three-quarters((5).
To succeed, the industrialised countries would have to agree,
by the second target period of the Kyoto Protocol (2013-
2017), to reduce their emissions far more drastically than
they are committed to do during the first period (2008-
2012). But a still greater challenge for the post-2012 negoti-
ations to confront is the determined opposition by southern
countries, particularly China and India, hitherto exempt from
targets, to subscribe in their turn to commitments on limiting
their emissions. In the absence of climate control policies
(and according to IPCC forecasts), emissions from the devel-
oping countries will by themselves equal or exceed, over this
century, the world total of emissions, rendering ineffective
any preventive action limited to the industrialised countries.Montreal :  the debate  opens onpost-2012  obligations
The Montreal Conference (December 2005) was an oppor-
tunity for governments to officially open discussions on how,
after 2012, they should reduce emissions((6). In fact, the Pro-
tocol includes two articles, Article 3.9 and Article 9, requir-
1. In 1995, the first Conference of Parties (COP 1) to the Convention, bolstered by new sci-
entific evidence of the extent of climatic change, agreed on the need to extend the com-
mitment of the Parties included in Annex 1 beyond 2000 to a specific target date (with
no new commitments by the southern countries). This “Berlin Mandate” was the forerun-
ner of the Kyoto Protocol, agreed upon in 1997 at COP 3. Thus, the Protocol brought into
being four significant advances on the Rio aspirations: delegates pledged to reduce emis-
sions by legally enforceable quotas (before, they had merely made declarations of prin-
ciple); to create two categories of government with different aims, the Annex 1 developed
countries and the Non-Annex 1 countries (where previously all governments had the
shared aim of stabilising emissions); they accepted specified targets for 2008-2012,
these to be succeeded by further five-year target periods (replacing the targets for 2000);
and they increased the number of targeted gases from three to six. To counterbalance the
acceptance of these tougher commitments, an element of flexibility was introduced to
realising these quantified aims. For this reason, in addition to putting in place policies and
national measures aimed at attenuating climate change and its impact, the Protocol
includes what are defined as “flexible mechanisms” allowing for International Emissions
Trading (IET), Clean Development (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). These are
designed to help Annex 1 economies to meet their targets in the most cost-efficient way.
2. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report on Climatic Change, 2007, Working Group 1 Report:
“The Physical Science Basis”, Summary for Policymakers, Paris, February 2nd 2007,
www.ipcc.ch
3. The global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, the most important of the
greenhouse gases, has increased from its pre-industrial level of about 280 parts per
million (ppm) to 379 ppm in 2005. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, op. cit..
4. Ibid.
5. Annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels have grown from 6.4 gigatons of carbon (GtC)
over the period 1990-1999 to 7.2 GtC for the period 2000-2005. 1 GtC corresponds to
3.67 GtC. IPPC Fourth Assessment Report, op. cit..
6. We are concerned here with the structures adopted at Kyoto. We shall not be raising the
question of US abstention. Nor can we address here the Asia-Pacific Partnership, the
new agreement that the Americans reached in July 2005 with Australia, China, India,
South Korea and Japan.
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The Concerted Effort to Fight
Climate Change
Towards a Fair Arrangement for Southern Countries to Become Partners in the Post-2012Commitments?
BÉATRICE  QUENAULT
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ing that the process for discussion on post-2012 should begin by
2005 at the latest, the deadline having been fixed with the adop-
tion of the Montreal Action Plan (MAP), setting out three
stages for opening the negotiations.
The first stage, according to Article 3.9, is to adopt a process
leading to the definition of new commitments by the industri-
alised countries, the Parties to Annex 1/B (PA1/B). The task
at Montreal was to determine which negotiating mechanism to
favour (workshop, say, or working group) and to create a
timetable for the work, including a deadline for industrialised
countries to adopt new targets((7).
The second stage, based on Article 9, proposes a complete re-
view of the Protocol (co-ordinated with the reviews under the
Convention required by Article 4.2.d) “in the light of the best
available scientific information and assessments on climate
change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and
economic information.” This reassessment((8) must include an
evaluation of the level of effort accepted by all Parties as well as
establishing the availability of technical and financial support for
the developing countries. Progress should be made towards a de-
cision that will intensify the commitments of the industrialised
countries and, at the same time, widen the participation of the
developing countries.
The third stage, designed to launch a process for adopting a post-
2012 package is to be conducted under the aegis of the Conven-
tion. It is to be a “dialogue on long term cooperative action to
fight climate change”. All the parties to the Convention are in-
volved. This process, embarked upon in Bonn in May 2006,
consists of four workshops that must concentrate on innovative
ideas to induce the developing countries to commit themselves
further (such as sectoral approaches and non-binding, flexible
targets). The process will consist only of exchanges of views, in-
formation and non-binding ideas and “will not open negotiations
likely to lead to new commitments((9)”. This process will open the
way towards lasting development; it will provide a response to dif-
ficult changes; and it will exploit the new technologies and mar-
ket opportunities in the fight against climate change.The  search for  a  mutual ly  ad-vantageous  and fa ir  agreement
The participation of the southern countries will require that
the question of fairness in the burden of sharing should be
addressed; and it must be reflected in commitments adapted
to each country’s specific situation and to the ultimate objec-
tive of the Convention. However, the Kyoto Protocol offers
only a rough framework, one that may well be adapted to the
particular circumstances of the industrialised countries but
remains totally inadequate for enabling southern countries to
join the system of emissions quotas.
It would be unrealistic to expect the developing countries,
those wishing to participate in the system of tradable emis-
sions permits implemented by the Protocol, to join Annex
B: that would require them first to be members of Annex 1
and therefore to accept all the concomitant obligations of
the Convention. So the idea of creating a new annex to the
Protocol, Annex C, was put forward during the fourth Con-
ference of Parties (COP 4, Buenos Aires, November
1998). Ahead of the debate on the second period commit-
ments, some southern countries suggested voluntary com-
mitments for the first period, hoping to join the system for
trading emissions quotas. As it happened, their proposals
opened the debate and began to circulate the idea of creat-
ing the new annex. It would include developing countries
wishing to make different kinds of commitments from those
by industrialised countries envisaged in Annex B: commit-
ments that would be non-binding and that might take the
form of, for example, diminishing the intensity of GHGs
within their economies, rather than imposing defined limits
on emissions. Aside from bringing the developing nations
into Annex 1/B (which is unthinkable), on what basis
might one now ask them for targeted commitments under
Annex C?Towards a  contract ion andconvergence pr inciple  for  reducing  emissions
When it comes to the form that the developing countries’ fu-
ture commitments might take, several options are today
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7. It was decided that an ad hoc working group of no fixed composition, the “Special
Working Group on New Commitments by the Parties defined in Annex B,” would lead the
consideration of how to amend the targets listed in Annex B. Although no timetable was
fixed, the Group would have to wind up its work as soon as possible (before 2008) so
as to assure continuity between the first and second target periods. The Group had its
first meeting in Bonn (17-25 May 2006), and the second in Nairobi (November 2006)
without making any significant progress.
8. Although it was on the agenda at the Nairobi conference, the Conference of Parties has
not yet begun its assessment. Switzerland, supported by the European Union and
Norway, proposed at Nairobi that a “process” should be embarked upon leading to the
evaluation of the Protocol. Because of this, discussions were focused on the reach, the
subject matter and the manner in which this evaluation should be conducted.
9. Because the southern countries have several times made clear their refusal to sign any
binding commitment on climate control, the decision is free of any constraints. During the
first workshop of the Dialogue (Bonn, May 2006), the debates and informal exchanges
between the participants revealed a number of common viewpoints on the Convention’s
long-term future. Yet, some delegates pointed out that divergent points of view on active
measures and future directions might emerge as the process advanced—and this is
what happened at the second workshop in Nairobi, in November 2006. Unsurprisingly,
when the Russian Federation suggested the possibility of voluntary commitments by
developing countries, member countries of the Group of 77 objected strongly.
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under discussion((10). Assuming that negotiations on climate
stabilisation continued to favour collaboration in the form of
allocating emissions quotas, the adoption of a common, long-
term emissions criterion per head of population and conver-
gence criteria taking account both of initial situations and de-
mographic and economic developments would be likely to
create the conditions for a compromise between countries at-
taching primary importance to starting positions and coun-
tries whose immediate demand was to establish the emis-
sions rights of each individual((11). The combined effect of
these two principles could lead, starting with global,
medium-term targets at each stage for the entire world, to
the search for a differentiated distribution of efforts by each
country (or each region) with a concern for their objectives
to converge in successive stages.
The Kyoto Protocol implicitly recognises that the lowest
emitting industrialised countries with least purchasing power
have the possibility of increasing their emissions in line with
their demographic and economic development needs: this
recognition represents the start of a process of integrating
long-term emissions quotas in terms of units of carbon per
head or of units of carbon in relation to GDP per head,
starting from very different initial circumstances. These early
steps towards differentiation are an important advance in the
debate on how to bring several, even possibly all, the devel-
oping countries, post-2012, into some arrangement for com-
mon commitments. The process needs to be explicit and fit
for the purpose of extending the present system to southern
countries according to a generic formula, applicable to each
country and not based on exceptional arrangements ac-
cepted only by some. The kind of exceptions that the Proto-
col has created for a few countries is in fact too specific to
serve as a basis for the participation of all developing coun-
tries. The idea of mastering the GHG-emissions of these
countries, which is now current at least in the minds of
northern negotiators, could never be realised on an equitable
basis. Most importantly, it must be founded on an explicit
logic, acceptable to all sides over the long term, based on
GHG-emissions per head of population and leading to com-
mon values compatible with climate change.Conclusion
If we seek to reach an agreement acceptable to all, it is es-
sential to clarify the debate surrounding future participation
of the developing nations. Alongside the delicate question of
how emissions rights can fairly be allocated, these discus-
sions ought to pave the way for a constructive approach to a
contraction and convergence timetable for stabilising emis-
sions. So it is right for us to explore further the various rules
and criteria likely to be applied and their redistributive effects
in terms of wealth and the allocation of emission rights((12).
If dialogue on future commitments could be dispassionately
pursued on the basis of clear, firm principles, while the range
of possible options was explored, the Kyoto Protocol would
be reinvigorated, along with the global management of climate
change. The governments concerned would then have the
extra incentives to implement effective and efficient policies
and measures to tackle the intensifying greenhouse effect. 
The fact remains that the future of the concerted battle
against climate change, waged under the aegis of the Kyoto
Protocol, is problematic: one can perceive a sharp decelera-
tion in the rhythm of advance—even a pause—when we look
at global ecological management. The last Nairobi Confer-
ence (November 2006), at which those parties present sat
tight in their respective positions, did nothing to dispel that
perception. The interplay of co-operation and conflict has
become more complex with the growing influence exerted
by newly industrialised countries such as India, China and
Brazil. Those governments have joined the United States in
holding back the formulation of new international rules on
the environment. And the negotiations to devise common,
long-term procedures for this “global ecological manage-
ment” have become all the more difficult. •
• Translated by Philip Liddell
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10. Numerous proposals have already been put forward. See, in particular: D Bodansky et
al., International Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches, Prepublication
Draft, Pew Center on Climate Change, Washington, DC, June 2004,
www.pewclimate.org. Alain Chetaille, Consolidation du régime multilatéral et prépara-
tion de l’agenda climat et développement post-2012, Pôle politiques publiques et régu-
lations internationales (PPRI) du Groupe de recherche et d’échanges technologiques
(GRET), Paris, January 2006, www.gret.org. N. Höhne, E. Lahme, Types of Future
Commitments Under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol Post 2012, WWF Briefing
Paper, Washington DC, 20 September 2005, www.panda.org. William D. Nordhaus, Life
after Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming Policies, Yale, 7 December 2005,
www.econ.yale.edu/nordhaus/kyoto_120805.doc. Cédric Philibert, Climate Mitigation:
Integrating Approaches for Future International Cooperation, information note on OECD
and AIE Environment Management, 14 November 2005, www.iea.org.
11. In the aftermath of Kyoto, the most extreme positions the Brazilian notion of historical
responsibility, the American assertion of continuing divergence justified by domestic
imperatives, the Indian proposal for emissions to be shared out equally per head—have
been set aside. Negotiations have gradually inclined opinions towards the differentiation
of efforts. The initial criterion of “acquired rights” (in the allocation of emissions rights,
objectives are founded upon a country’s history and its particular circumstances) has
been filled out by the notions of demographic evolution, initial wealth and development
needs. Admittedly, these different notions have not become explicit criteria, but they
have allowed all sides to justify their varying aims in the service of a shared goal.
12. For more on this, see: Béatrice Quenault, “Protocole de Kyoto et gouvernance écologique
mondiale: enjeux et perspectives des engagements post-2012”, in Mondes en
Développement, vol. 34, n° 136, April 2006, pp. 29-47; “Changements climatiques –
Quelles stratégies post-Kyoto?”, in Vie & Sciences Économiques, n° 166-167,
November-December 2004, pp. 95-103.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
